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AS OLD AS THE HILLS: 
DETENTION AND IMMIGRATION 
LENNIB.BENSON* 
How will you answer when you are asked: 
Did you know people were being imprisoned? 
Did you know how many? 
Why did you let your government put immigrants in prison? 
I. Detention is Not New: 
Is It a Necessary Part of Control over Immigrants? 
If you are reading this essay and the related symposium 
articles, you will learn a great deal about the role detention plays in 
U.S. immigration law. You will become a witness to our 
government's use of a tool that directly and undeniably impinges on 
our most fundamental freedom: personal liberty. It is my hope that 
by writing this essay, I may contribute to a reexamination by all of us 
of the reasons we use immigration detention; and that we will ask 
fundamental questions about whether immigration detention is a 
legitimate tool. As we learn more, we all become witnesses to our 
government's actions. 
Today we will become educated, and informed. We will 
have data: 30,000 men, women and children are in direct 
immigration detention every day. 1 More than 350,000 people were 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Special thanks for excellent research 
assistance to Jessica Orozco and Margaret Laufman, third year students at New 
York Law School. I also thank Lindsay Curcio and Matilde Cohen for very 
helpful comments on the early drafts of this essay. 
1 For a detailed and critical assessment of U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) detention, see Dora Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview 
& Recommendations (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
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held for some period of formal detention last year.2 I have been a 
lawyer for approximately twenty-five years and this use of detention 
represents a 70-fold increase in detention since I graduated law 
school in the mid 1980's.3 What justifies this dramatic increase in 
immigration detention? What policy rationales explain the 
explosion? 
Detention is not new. What is new is the breadth, the length, 
and the scope of immigration detention. Detention is as old as 
immigration law itself. We use immigration law and detention as a 
weapon in the law's enforcement because we seek to control our 
border. Pause for a moment. "To Control Our Border" - What a 
euphemism. What an overt lie. We do not mean that our border is a 
wild, untamed, moving and dangerous entity. It is an imaginary line 
drawn on a map. We have no direct need to control a physical 
boundary between countries or our coast line; our "border control" is 
person control and containment. Let us abandon the mask of 
euphemism and admit that immigration law is fundamentally law 
about controlling people. We use detention to control people directly 
and because we hope that the use of detention will deter others from 
attempting to breach the border. Detention is people control. 
We arrest, we interrogate, we incarcerate and we control the 
people within and arriving at the shores of our nation and the people 
in our immigration detention are not just the newly arrived or the 
"criminal offender." In fact, a large number of the detained are 
either long term permanent residents or those who are pursuing a 
claim for protection from persecution or torture. 4 
091005 _ice_ detention _report-final.pdf. 
2 Id. See also Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Immigration Detention: 
Can ICE Meet its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities? 
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSep 
t1009.pdf. 
3 See Schriro, supra note 1, at 2 (the annual detention in 1983 was less than 
5,000 people per year. In 1995, the average population in immigration detention 
was 7, 500 and in 2009 ICE had 30,000 beds under management). 
4 See Kerwin & Lin, supra note 2, at 1 (suggesting that 58% of the individuals 
in immigration detention have no criminal record). 
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In this essay, I remind us of the close connection between the 
uses of immigration detention, particularly, the rapid expansion of 
detention and the need of our government officials to demonstrate 
"control over the border" by demonstrating the power to arrest and 
detain at length the undesirable alien from within our society. 5 And 
while not every immigration detention ends in removal, in fact, as 
you will hear from other speakers, there is a growing number of 
people whom our government cannot remove and in some cases has 
no intention of removing from the U.S., the power of detention itself 
serves the government's goals of showing control in times of fear. 6 
II. The Fundamental Question: Does the U.S. Government Employ 
Limited and Tailored Civil Detention? 
In 2002 Professor David Cole of Georgetown wrote: 
[T]he Supreme Court's approach to the issue of physical 
custody has been relatively noncontroversial. While there 
have been disagreements around the edges, certain 
principles have garnered nearly unanimous consent. 
Foremost among them is the neo-Kantian notion that the 
government cannot lock up people without having a good 
reason, specific to the individual, for doing so. Outside of 
wartime, no Justice on the Court has even argued for civil 
detention in the absence of an individualized finding that 
the detention is necessary to protect against a distinct 
5 See Jennifer Chac6n, Blurred Boundaries in Immigration: Unsecured 
Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1837 (2007) (noting the pattern of conflating immigration control 
with national security concerns). 
6 There are several excellent books that report in depth some of our nation's 
history of fearing, detaining, and seeking deportation of aliens. See, e.g., DAVID 
COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN 
THE w AR ON TERRORISM (The New Press 2003); WILLIAM PRESTON, ALIENS AND 
DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933 (University of 
Illinois Press 1963)(1994); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS Tll'vlES: FREE SPEECH IN 
W ARTil'vlE FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (W.W. 
Norton & Co., Inc. 2004) (focusing on the general restrictions on free speech for 
aliens and citizens). 
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danger posed by the individual sought to be detained. In a 
recent decision surveying the landscape, the Supreme 
Court stated that "government detention violates th[ e Due 
Process] Clause" unless it is imposed as punishment in a 
criminal proceeding conforming to the rigorous procedures 
constitutionally required for such proceedings, or "in 
certain special and 'narrow' non-punitive 
'circumstances."' Non-punitive, or preventive, detention is 
permissible only where an individual (1) is either in 
criminal or immigration proceedings and has been shown 
to be a danger to the community or flight risk; (2) is 
dangerous because of a "harm-threatening mental illness" 
that impairs his ability to control his dangerousness; or (3) 
is an enemy alien during a declared war.7 
Thus, the basic constitutional principle is that civil detention 
must be measured and tempered by individualized decision making 
and by finding that the individual presents a "danger to the 
community" or a "flight risk." Yet, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) flatly and facially contradicts that essential concept of 
individual decision-making. In Section 236 of the INA, Congress 
created a presumption of detention for people apprehended by the 
federal government at the border who lack documents for admission 
or who seek asylum. 8 In the past ten years, Congress dramatically 
increased "mandatory" detention of people, including those who 
have held permanent resident status. For example, Section 236 
sweeps into mandatory detention any person whom the Department 
7 David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration 
Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1008, 1010 (2002) (examining Supreme Court decisions 
concerning the incarceration of non-citizens and distinguishing carefully between 
strained statutory interpretations and constitutional analysis in the opinions). 
8 INA§ 235(b)(l)(B)(IV) (requiring mandatory detention of asylum seekers at 
the border); INA § 236(c)(l)(A) (requiring mandatory detention of non-citizens 
who are inadmissible due to convictions or admissions of crimes of moral 
turpitude); INA§ 236(c)(l)(B) (requiring detention of those who are deportable for 
a crime of moral turpitude committed within five years of admission where the 
sentence was at least one year). See INA§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) (an alien who has been 
convicted of a controlled substance violation and is deportable due to that 
conviction is subject to mandatory detention regardless of the nature of the 
criminal sentence). 
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of Homeland Security (DHS) believes has been convicted of multiple 
crimes of moral turpitude, such as two shoplifting convictions, or a 
crime related to a controlled substance. For example, a person might 
be detained by immigration due to any conviction relating to a 
controlled substance, whether it was simple possession of marijuana 
or possession of a prescription medicine without a prescription.9 No 
matter how minor the criminal offense, Congress appeared to 
mandate detention for this category of non-citizens during their 
removal hearings. 
The DHS repeatedly relied on the mandatory language in the 
INA to justify the use and growth of detention. 10 Litigation 
expanded challenging the use and breadth of detention. In a series of 
U.S. Supreme Court cases, where the Court relied frequently on the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance to avoid reading the INA as 
creating unlimited detention, we begin to find some restraint. These 
cases have been thoroughly analyzed and deconstructed elsewhere 
and I present only a basic outline here. First, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 11 
a five to four majority of the Supreme Court held that the INA did 
not authorize unlimited detention of a non-citizen who had a final 
order of removal where the government could not effectuate the 
removal because no country would accept the individual. 12 Stopping 
short of reaching a constitutional basis for the decision, the majority 
concluded that Congress had meant to create a real deadline for 
executing orders of removal and if the DHS could not execute the 
9 See Christopher Shea, Sullivan Avoids Pot Charge; Judge Objects, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas 
/brainiac/2009/09/sullivan_ avoids _pot_ charges.html. 
10 Dep't of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector Gen., Detention and 
Removal of Illegal Aliens, OIG-06-33 (Apr. 2006), available at http:// 
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-33_Apr06.pdf. The report states, "A 
sharp increase in the number of aliens requiring mandatory detention may soon 
limit DRO's ability to detain non-mandatory aliens who pose a potential national 
security or public safety risk ... DRO's ability to detain high-risk aliens is 
impacted by the mandatory detention requirements set by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act." Id. at 5-6. 
11 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
12 See INA§ 241(a)(6) (stating that after an order of removal, the non-citizen 
may be detained for ninety days and that further detention requires a finding that 
the detainee is a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order). 
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order, then they could use an additional period of detention only 
where they could show they were making progress toward final 
removal from the u.s.13 
Next, in Demore v. Kim, 14 a five to four majority 
distinguished the limit on removal post the deportation or removal 
proceedings. The Court held that a permanent resident alien, who had 
conceded removability due to a conviction and sought discretionary 
relief, could be detained during the pendency of the removal 
proceedings and administrative appeal. The majority of the Court 
concluded that mandatory detention without the possibility of bond 
was not an unconstitutional deprivation of his liberty. The majority 
expressly assumed that the detention period would be brief, relying 
on agency data that indicated that the vast majority of detained 
immigration cases were decided in less than forty-seven days. 15 The 
Court also noted that the respondent alien, by conceding 
removability, had lost his permanent resident status and did not 
express an opinion about the use of mandatory detention for those 
permanent residents who contested removal. 
Finally, in Clark v. Martinez, 16 the Supreme Court extended 
the limited detention interpretation used in Zadvydas to even those 
aliens who had never been formally admitted to the U.S. and whose 
13 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (explaining that the Court determined that it was 
reasonable for the government to have an additional period of ninety days after the 
statutory period and thus Zadvydas is interpreted as creating a six month period of 
presumed reasonable and lawful post removal order detention). See 8 U.S.C. § 
1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). 
14 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
15 See id. at 527-29 (Chief Justice Rehnquist citing to the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR) statistics that 85% of all detained cases were 
completed within an average of 4 7 days and the median was 30 days of detention. 
The Court went on to note that even longer cases where the non-citizen appealed to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals took an average of four months); see also 
Kerwin & Lin, supra note 2, at 17-18 (reporting that the length of detention was 
artificially lowered by counting one day detentions in removals to Mexico). This 
study showed that many people were in detention in excess of 90 days and several 
hundred more than one year. Id. at 6. 
ICE states that 2, 100 people are held over one year but that the average length of 
detention is thirty days. Schirio, supra note 1, at 6. 
16 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
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detention was initiated as part of their apprehension at the border. 
Clark involved the long term detention of Cuban nationals who were 
apprehended trying to seek admission to the U.S. during the 
Marielito boat lift in 1980.17 While the Supreme Court had 
traditionally afforded few constitutional rights to noncitizens at the 
border, the fact that the individuals in Clark had been incarcerated 
for much of twenty-five years as "inadmissible" aliens and lacked 
any possibility of legalization under the INA, made the majority 
conclude that Congress must have intended to allow individualized 
assessments and release where there was no possibility of removal 
from the U.S. 
Thus, detention per se in the immigration context has not 
been found to be a violation of civil rights nor an unconstitutional 
deprivation of liberty. There is something about immigration law, a 
species of civil and not of criminal law that allows the government to 
make a presumption of either "harm to the community" or "flight 
risk." Why is detention permissible in immigration law, as opposed 
to other important areas of civil law enforcement, whether it be tax 
collection or environmental protection? In a nation that abolished 
federal debtor's prisons in 1835, why does the status of an 
individual's citizenship allow a civil detention and restriction of 
individual liberty without individualized decision making? 
17 Clark, 543 U.S. at 374-75. See Brief of Phil Crawford, Interim Field Office 
Director, Portland Oregon, United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement, et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Clark v. Martinez, No. 03-878, 543 
U.S. 371 (2005) (explaining how it is extremely difficult for the U.S. to return an 
individual to Cuba due to the breakdown of negotiations with the Cuban 
government over repatriation of Cuban nationals). Over 125,000 Cubans originally 
arrived during the Marielito boatlifts and, although the vast majority had been able 
to successfully adjust status to permanent resident, more than 4,020 individuals 
had, due to criminal convictions within the U.S., been subjected to arrest and 
detention by the immigration authorities more than once. Id. at 7-8. The 
government asserted that although it had been able to return a significant number 
of people to Cuba, the current negotiations can be described as "halting" and 
suspended due to the refusal of the Cuban government to discuss "migration issues 
seriously." Id. at 9. 
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In this essay, I tum to some of the historical roots of 
immigration law enforcement and the use of detention to explore the 
answer to these questions. Perhaps by turning away from our own 
immediate time period and our current justifications, we can examine 
in a more detached manner the justifications of this fundamental 
encroachment on personal integrity and liberty. 
Ill. Beware the "Wild Irish" and the Blood Thirsty French: The 
Alien and Sedition Laws 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, many people have 
the impression that we must tighten immigration laws and control 
over non-citizens in order to secure the nation. Most people are 
unaware of the prior periods in history when we have turned to 
detention and immigration controls as part of federal government's 
reactions to a fear of revolution, attacks or the spread of political 
movements that might use violence. Yet, almost from the birth of 
our federal government, Congress has passed legislation restricting 
or limiting the rights of non-citizens. 
Most infamously, in 1798, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Alien and Sedition laws, a set of four statutes that restricted the 
rights of citizens and non-citizens to criticize the government or to 
take acts that might organize opposition to the sitting federal 
government. In justifying this restrictive legislation, passed so soon 
after our own national rebellion against British rule but at a time 
when Congress was preoccupied with a possible war with France, 
Congress member Harrison Gray Otis stated that the young nation 
had to be protected from the French revolutionaries who would bring 
bloody terror and destruction of the propertied classes to the U.S. 
shores. 18 In an earlier session he called for limiting naturalization to 
18 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2150 (1798). For an excellent examination of these 
statutes, see JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND 
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1967). See also STONE, supra 
note 6. A descendant of Representative Otis published a thoughtful biography that 
takes great pains to explain the context of his remarks made in a time where many 
believe war with France was imminent. See also 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE 
LIFE AND LETTERS OF HARRISON GRAY OTIS: FEDERALIST: 1765-1848 (1912). 
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protect the nation from the dangerous actions of the "Wild Irish."19 
These statutes called for detention with bond for any person, alien or 
citizen, who might advocate for revolution.20 While most of these 
statutes expired two years later, one statute remains in force today, 
The Enemy Aliens Act, passed in 1789, gives the President the 
power to detain, deport, or control the liberty of any person over 
fourteen years old who is a national or citizen of a country with 
which we are at war.21 
The Alien and Sedition laws are often viewed as a low point 
in American history and the constitutionality of the statutes debated 
even at the time. But they mark the important first steps where 
Congress has authorized the detention of "enemy aliens" throughout 
our history. Some would vigorously defend the right of the 
government to use preventative detention during times of war and we 
certainly know that during our nation;s history we have utilized such 
detentions.22 The rationales are usually clear; the demands of war do 
not afford us the time and luxury to make case by case 
determinations of the dangerousness and loyalties of foreign 
nationals residing in our country. Yet, what may be reasonable in 
19 SMITH, supra note 18, at 24 (noting that Harrison Gray Otis' proposed 
legislation was defeated but soon thereafter the federalists limited naturalization to 
white males who had resided fourteen years within the U.S., the longest period of 
residence required in the history of our nation. When the federalists lost control of 
Congress, the residence period was reduced again to five years, the maximum time 
period required of most applicants for naturalization). See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 
1427 (1998). 
20 See Larry Gragg, American History: Passage of the Alien and Sedition Act, 
AMERICAN HISTORY, Oct. 1998, available at http://www.historynet.com/ 
american-history-passage-of-the-alien-and-sedition-acts.htm/5. 
21 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1923). For a discussion of this statute and the relevance 
today to the detention during the war on terror, see Cole, supra note 7, at 1009-10. 
22 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Our nation has also 
detained other nationalities during time of war. In World War I, many Germans 
were detained. In a speech to Congress requesting a new statute to support the 
deportation of the detained Germans, Congressman John L. Burnett of Alabama 
testified that there were 4,020 Germans detained in 1919 and half of those were 
Germans detained aboard ships seized at sea. See To Expel and Exclude From the 
United States Certain Undesirable Aliens: To Accompany H.R. 16017 Before the 
H., 65th Cong. (Feb. 19, 1919) (Rep. by John L. Burnett, Chairman, House Comm. 
on Immigration and Naturalization), available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/ 
view/7 455009?n=1 &imagesize=2400&jp2Res=0.5. 
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theory is often abused in scope and application. Many scholars and 
historians report the examples of large scale detentions as periods of 
the failure of our country to protect liberty and acknowledge the 
sacrifice that individuals made to the political exigencies of war. 23 
What political leader during war time wants to risk releasing a 
foreign national who might, in some way, directly or indirectly, aid a 
war effort against us? 
The focus of this essay is not detention of the "enemy alien," 
but instead, the justifications our government has used to justify civil 
detentions as a part of immigration enforcement. Still, a keystone to 
the justification comes first from the acceptance that during war, 
enemy aliens may be detained and an acceptance that non-citizens 
have not fully established themselves as presumptively loyal. 
Because war was never declared against France, the original Enemy 
Alien Act was not used to detain or deport any non-citizens because 
no formal declaration of war was ever made. 
In the first Supreme Court case to seriously address the rights 
of citizens apprehended during wartime, the Court, in a 5 to 4 
decision, wrote that the law was "almost as old as the Constitution, 
and it would savor of doctrinaire audacity now to find the statute 
offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights."24 The majority 
did not offer any other explanation to justify detention and yet the 5-
4 decision should by itself, raise questions as to the scope and 
validity of the precedent. Professor Cole has noted that the decision 
has been recently cited by the Supreme Court to stand for the 
proposition that even Enemy Aliens cannot be detained without some 
finding of danger and he suggests that the finding must be made on 
an individualized basis. 25 
The Enemy Alien Acts and the justified use of detention have 
sown the seeds and fostered the growth of at least one foundation 
argument that justifies immigration detention. The "alien," 
regardless of length of residence in the U.S., can be detained during 
23 See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND: PATTERNS OF 
AMERICANNATIVISM, 1860-1925 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2d ed. 1983) (1955); COLE, 
supra note 6. 
24 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948); Cole, supra note 7. 
25 Cole, supra note 7, at 1013. 
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the time of war. How did this war power expand so dramatically into 
our general civil law? Moreover, even where Congress sought to 
insulate decisions about Enemy Alien Combatants held on 
Guantanamo, the Supreme Court has recently upheld the right of 
such individuals to seek individualized decision making about the 
legitimacy of their continued detention. 26 It is beyond the scope of 
this article to fully explore how the recent Guantanamo decisions 
might mean that aliens held in immigration detention should have 
even greater procedural rights but, given those cases, it does appear 
that the Supreme Court may be open to revisiting some of the prior 
assumptions our law has made about the use of civil detention in this 
context.27 
IV. Detention as the Necessary Tool of Admission Controls 
In the beginning of the United States as a federal entity, there 
were not detailed immigration controls at the border. While some 
busy ports and states tried to regulate admissions through head taxes 
or used laws to regulate the importation of goods or to quarantine 
infected sailors, passengers and products, Congress had no 
centralized law requirinr the inspection of people seeking admission 
to the U.S. until 1875.2 This statute delegated inspection authority 
to the federal port officials and authorized the exclusion of criminals 
and prostitutes. This law was soon expanded in both the general 
Immigration Act of 188229 and the specialized Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882. 30 Together, these statutes created a federal regime of 
border inspections and a system for the inspection of people arriving 
at ports by the officials under the control of the Secretary of the 
26 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). 
27 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene 
v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global 
Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2009); David Cole, Out of the Shadows: 
Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693 (2009); 
Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After 
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009). 
28 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. 
29 Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. 
3° Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. 
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Treasury. In Lem Moon Sing v. U.S., the Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the authority of the federal government to detain or 
arrest a non-citizen.31 These early statutes contained a right of 
detention as a right of delayed admission to the U.S. but the authority 
executing the detention was usually the private shipping company. 
Just as goods might be forbidden, and sailors carrying infection 
might be quarantined, these first statutes similarly required the 
detention of immigrants on board or at the bond and expense of the 
shipping company. 
These detentions were contemplated as brief, short term 
periods where the infection could run its course or the person's 
admission would be refused and the shipping company would bear 
the cost of removing the individual refused admission. With the 
passage of the Chinese Exclusion laws, the use of detention as a 
delayed admission control became more prevalent. One of the 
problems in enforcing the exclusion law was that Chinese individuals 
claimed to have entered the U.S. before the 1882 exclusion act. In 
1888, Congress authorized the arrest of any Chinese person found to 
be unlawfully within the U.S. 32 Still, the government found that 
many people continued to argue they had entered before the ban. 
Thus, in 1892, Congress authorized the expulsion or deportation of 
Chinese who could not prove in a judicial hearing that they had 
resided within the U.S. prior to the 1882 exclusion acts. 33 The 
statute specifically required that at least one White witness testify as 
to the longevity of the Chinese person's residence. The deportation 
statute specifically authorized detention by the U.S. Marshal while 
the hearing was held about his or her eligibility to remain. 34 
In her book, Laws Harsh as Tigers, the historian Lucy Salyer, 
studied the hundreds of writs of habeas corpus filed to challenge the 
detention of Chinese nationals. 35 Her masterful discussion brings the 
31 Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895). 
32 An Act To Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Laborers to the United States, 
ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 476, 479 (1888). 
33 Geary Act, ch. 60, §§ 2-3, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (giving people one year to 
apply for a certificate). See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 
(1893) (upholding constitutionality of power to deport and not just to exclude). 
34 Geary Act, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25 (1892); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727. 
35 LUCY E. SAL YER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
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stories of ordinary men and women into vivid focus. Reading her 
description, you learn how both the detained immigrants and the 
government inspectors viewed their roles in the inspection process. 
Her book also amply documents the successful litigation strategies 
employed by attorneys and immigration advocates that resulted in a 
modest expansion of the rights of individuals to have individualized 
determinations made about their eligibility to enter the U.S. And yet, 
for almost every advance in ensuring fair procedures and 
individualized decisions making, the Supreme Court or Congress 
curtailed the process and truncated or restricted judicial review. In 
several important Supreme Court cases, the court established that the 
factual determinations of the immigration inspectors could not be 
disturbed in judicial review36 and that even summary removal 
procedures, conducted in a language the immigrant did not 
understand could comport with the due process standards of the 
time.37 Salted into these early cases are some of the fundamental 
principles of immigration law that provide the doctrinal foundation 
for detention, perhaps even a prolonged detention. Similarly, 
Congress in this period expanded the authority of the immigration 
officials and truncated the scope of judicial review.38 
These key principles were that even though immigration laws 
might use detention, provided the incarceration was not one ordered 
as punishment or at hard labor, the detention would be civil in nature 
and not represent the use of criminal authority by the federal 
govemment.39 In the seminal case of Wong Wing v. U.S., the Court 
SHAPING OF MODERN lMMIGRA TION LAW 18 ( 1995). 
36 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), aff'd, United 
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 646-47 (1905). 
37 Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 102 (1903). 
38 See Act of August 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 390 (restricting judicial 
review in response to success of immigrants challenging inspector refusals of 
admission). See also SALYER, supra note 35, at 112 (noting in the past twelve 
years, Congress has used this same technique of attempting to restrict non-citizens' 
access to the federal courts to theoretically expedite and streamline the removal 
process). See also Table of Contents, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., VOL. 51 (2006-2007), 
available at http://www.nyls.edu/user _ files/1/3/4/17 /49/front%205 l-1.pdf (volume 
discussing the recent history of court-stripping in the New York Law School 
Review symposium issue). 
39 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (rejecting criminal 
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wrote: 
We think it clear that detention or temporary confinement, 
as part of the means necessary to give effect to the 
provisions of the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be 
valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if 
those accused could not be held in custody pending the 
inquiry into their true character, and while arrangements 
were being made for their deportation. Detention is a usual 
feature in every case of arrest on a criminal charge, even 
when an innocent person is wrongfully accused; but it is 
not imprisonment in a legal sense. 
So, too, we think it would be plainly competent for 
congress to declare the act of an alien in remaining 
unlawfully within the United States to be an offense 
punishable by fine or imprisonment, if such offense were to 
be established by a judicial trial. [emphasis added]. Wong 
Wing at 235. 
Thus, the federal authorities had an inherent authority to use 
detention as part of their power to enforce the immigration laws. 40 
Yet, federal courts could use the vehicle of the writ for habeas corpus 
to challenge the legality of the immigration detention.41 
The growth of this immigration authority was not, of course, 
limited to only the foreigner. U.S. citizens were far from immune. 
Once the Chinese Exclusion laws broadly precluded Chinese 
admissions, some people sought to avoid the laws by claiming U.S. 
citizenship. Until 1943, a Chinese national could not naturalize and 
obtain citizenship because only "Whites" were eligible for 
naturalization.42 Therefore, the only way to secure citizenship was 
incarceration unless the non-citizen first receives a full criminal trial with all due 
process and Constitutional protections). 
4° Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For a fuller 
discussion of these important cases, see Gabriel Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong 
Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES (David A. 
Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
41 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (stating the general authority 
for challenging federal civil detention). 
42 See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (the Supreme Court 
rejected a challenge that the statute requirement of "White" race membership was 
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by birth in the U.S. territory. Many Chinese families sent their 
young children back to China to be raised by grandparents and to 
acquire Chinese education and language training. Others, knowing 
they could not gain admission without a claim of citizenship, 
falsified birth records to make a citizenship claim. The lack of 
uniform records at the time and the inspector's fear of widespread 
fraud led to U.S. citizens of Chinese ancestry being detained while 
they tried to challenge the inspector's rejection of their claim of 
citizenship. Lucy Salyer writes of one U.S. citizen of Chinese 
ancestry who spent two years in fetid detention on the docks of San 
Francisco, California and gave up and returned to China. When the 
Supreme Court returned a judgment in his favor, the Court found that 
his initial hearing was unfair and that he could return to litigate his 
claim of citizenship. His reply to his U.S. lawyers was that he would 
"rather die" than risk further detention by immigration officials.43 
These early immigration statutes and the history of Chinese 
exclusion built a foundation for later expansion of grounds of 
inadmissibility and of removal. The Supreme Court's posture of 
calling these removal proceedings civil proceedings remains 
undisturbed despite repeat challenges throughout the 20th Century. 
not meant to exclude people from Asia); see also In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (W.D. 
Tex. 1897) (similar arguments challenging the statute requirement of "White" race 
membership were also rejected for people from India but rejected in 1903 from 
Mexico of European dissent). For an excellent discussion of race and citizenship, 
see IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LA w: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996). See also John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness, Naturalization Litigation 
and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (1999-
2000). 
43 SAL YER, supra note 3 5, at 1 77. 
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V. The Red Scare of 1919and1920 
Terror strikes hardest when it comes in the form of an object 
we trust. None of us will ever again look at low flying airliners 
swooping over a city skyline without some small shiver of fear -a 
fleeting question in our mind about why the plane is so close, so low. 
If an envelope arrives with a hand printed address and white dust we 
freeze -we fear. In 1919, the fear came wrapped in the decorative 
boxes of Gimbel's Department store.44 At the end of April 1919, 
Ethel Williams, a maid at the home of former U.S. senator Thomas 
Hardwick, opened a box from Gimbel's Department store and a 
crude bomb exploded. She lost both of her hands in the explosion. 
The explosion was so strong it knocked down Mrs. Hardwick and 
seriously injured her as well. The Gimbel's mail bomb story traveled 
fast and the New York morning edition papers ran front page stories. 
Around two in the morning on May 1, 1919, a day that was 
becoming aligned with worker's parades all over the world, a tired 
postal clerk Stanley Caplan picked up a copy of the early papers to 
read on the subway as he headed home from the main post office at 
34th Street and gth Avenue in New York. Stanley read the stories of 
the Gimbel's bomb. Earlier in his shift, he had set aside sixteen 
Gimbel's packages for insufficient postage. He jumped off the 
subway at the next stop and returned to the Post Office. There, he 
and his supervisor contacted the New York police. Just as Caplan 
had feared, the packages contained crude pipe bombs. It took six 
hours to disarm the first bomb. An hour later, the story of the 
Gimbel's bombs was being telegraphed across the country. 
Eventually 36 boxes mailed to U.S. attorneys, members of Congress 
and prominent business leaders were discovered. No one else was 
harmed by an exploding package. No person or organization came 
44 Much of this history is based on the book, EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER 
RAIDS, 1919-1920: AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (1969). Mr. Hoyt begins 
his book with the chilling story of the discovery of the Gimbel bombs and I have 
adopted his narrative to help us all relive the real fear that must have gripped 
Attorney General Palmer and many government leaders due to the discovery of 
these mail bombs in the summer of 1919. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The 
(Un)Favorable Judgment of History: Deportation Hearings, the Palmer Raids, and 
the Meaning of History, 78 NYU L. REV. 1433 (2003) (an in-depth recitation of 
some of this history). 
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forward to claim responsibility. Journalists and politicians assumed 
the bombs were the coordinated work of radical aliens and labor 
activists -assumptions perhaps created by the fact that the people 
who were the targets of the bombings were perceived as open 
opponents of organized labor or of immigrants: 
John D. Rockefeller, the richest man in the U.S. 
J.P. Morgan 
Chair of the House Committee of Immigration, J.S. Burnett 
of Alabama 
Postmaster General Albert Burleson, who had 
administrated the Espionage Act of 1918 and sent 
approximately 800 "radicals" to jail during the war due to 
those prosecutions. 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Homes 
Mayor Ole Hanson of Seattle who had broken a city-wide 
general strike 
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson who directed the 
Immigration Service's work against anarchists and leftists. 
The New York City police commissioner 
The U.S. Commissioner oflmmigration 
The Chief Office of Ellis Island45 
Members of Congress immediately began to criticize 
President Wilson's administration. They asked why the Secretary of 
Labor and the recently appointed Attorney General, A. Mitchell 
Palmer, were not doing more to deport radical aliens. The Wilson 
administration had deported over fifty members of the Industrial 
Workers of the World using the 191 7 immigration laws, authorizing 
deportation of people who advocate the violent overthrow of the 
government. At the time of the Gimbel's bombings, no other 
deportations were scheduled. 
45 HOYT, supra note 44, at 20-23 (noting that perhaps all of these targets 
opposed radical organizers of labor. Certainly the response of the press and public 
officials to the information about the targets was to call for a crack down on the 
Industrial Workers of the World ("1.W.W.") and other communist sympathizers). 
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Mixed into the fear of these bombings were growing fears of 
general labor unrest. The U.S. experienced its first large scale strikes 
when almost the entire city of Seattle went on strike in 1919. 
Moreover, strikes were erupting in several industries from steel to 
mining. Hoyt reported this as one of the greatest periods of labor 
unrest in the history of the U.S.Perhaps the most important factor for 
raising fear in Congress was the Bolshevik revolution that had 
successfully overthrown the Czarist regime in Russia and had held 
onto power for more than a year despite armed opposition from 
White Russians and several allied armies including a contingent of 
U.S. troops. Just as we saw in the Alien and Sedition Laws, 
Congress again feared that a foreign revolution might find support 
and spread to the U.S. through the aegis of the immigrants from 
Europe. 
The chair of the Immigration Subcommittee, Congressman 
John L. Burnett of Alabama and one of the intended recipients of an 
unexploded Gimbel's bomb, had introduced a bill to freeze all 
immigration.46 Attorney General Palmer was still reluctant to 
attribute all radical activity to immigrants or to believe that there was 
a large organized revolutionary force at work in the United States. 
But all of that changed when, at 11: 15 p.m. on June 2, 1919, a bomb 
exploded in front of Palmer's house in Washington D.C. The 
explosion was so loud that neighbors came running out of their 
houses. Quickly searching through the wreckage, Palmer and the 
others found pieces of a body. Apparently, the bomb's creator had 
46 Chairman Hon. John L. Burnett had originally introduced a bill proposing 
the suspension of all immigration for a four year period after the peace treaty was 
signed ending World War I. See Prohibition of Immigration: Hearing on H.R. 
13325, 13669, 13904, and 14577 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and 
Naturalization, 65th Cong. 3 (3d Sess. 1919) (statement of Comm. Chairman Hon. 
John L. Burnett). The resolutions proposed restricted immigration in the winter of 
1919. Id. (statement of Louis Marshall, President of the American Jewish Comm. 
And Vice-President of the American Jewish Cong.). Burnett also introduced bills 
to expand the use of deportation. H.R. REP. N o.1093. Burnett died in May of 1919 
and in the tribute paid to him in the House, many spoke of his tireless work to 
control immigration. See generally H.R.J. Res. 1021, 66th Cong. (1920). See also 
John L. Burnett Dies In Alabama: Congressman Whose Bill for Deportation of 
Dangerous Aliens Brought Him a Bomb: In Congress Since 1899: Chairman of the 
Committee on Immigration Had Long Been a Democratic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 1919, at 17. 
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mistimed the fuse. They also found several copies of a pamphlet 
"Plain Words." The pamphlet in part read as follows: 
The powers that be make no secret of their will to stop here 
in American the world-wide spread of revolution. The 
powers that be must reckon that they will have to accept 
the fight they have provoked ... 
A time has come when the social question's solution can 
be delayed no longer; class war is on, and cannot cease but 
with a complete victory for the international proletariat ... 
The challenge is an old one, 0 democratic lords of the 
autocratic republic. We have been dreaming of freedom, 
we have talked of liberty, we have aspired to a better 
world, and you jailed us, you clubbed us, you deported us, 
you murdered us whenever you could ... 
There will be bloodshed, we will not dodge; there will 
have to be murder; we will kill, because it is necessary; 
there will have to be destruction, we will destroy to rid the 
world of your tyrannical institutions ... 4 7 
That same evening, June 2, 1919, seven additional c1t1es 
found bombs and Palmer was among other government officials 
from mayors to members of Congress who found their homes and 
offices bombed. The next morning Palmer spoke to the press: 
The outrages of last night indicate nothing but the lawless 
attempt of an anarchistic element in the population to 
terrorize the country and thus stay the hand of the 
government. This they have utterly failed to do. 
The purposes of the Department of Justice are the same 
today as yesterday. These attacks by bomb throwers will 
only increase and extend the activities of our crime-
detecting forces. 
We are determined now, as heretofore, that organized 
crime directed against organized government in this 
47 Palmer and Family Safe: On Second Floor When Explosion Wrecked 
Lower Part of House, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1919 (emphasis added), in HOYT, supra 
note 44, at 30-31. 
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country shall be stopped.48 
Within a few weeks of the summer bombing, Attorney 
General Palmer and his young assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, began to 
plan for surveillance and arrest of radical aliens. In the fall of 1919, 
there were several major raids and the well publicized deportation 
hearings of prominent anarchist alien, Emma Goldman.49 
The first great sweep aimed at the "Reds" was conducted on 
the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 7, 1919.50 
That raid took place simultaneously in Newark, Detroit, 
Philadelphia, Hartford, Boston and New York. In New York, the 
officers had twenty seven warrants, prepared by the Department of 
Labor Immigration Bureau, for the arrest of aliens who were 
committed to the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. One 
report said that more than "700 policemen and state investigators 
raided 73 radical centers, arrested more than 500 people and 
continued the new policy of 'roughing up the reds."' 51 
48 Attorney General Palmer Warns the Anarchists That Bomb Attacks Only 
Increase His Activities, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1919 (statement of Alexander Mitchell 
Palmer, Att'y Gen. of the United States), in HOYT, supra note 44, at 31-32. 
49 Emma Goldman maintained in her autobiography that she was a citizen by 
virtue of her early marriage to a United States citizen. See 2 EMMA GOLDMAN, 
LIVING MY LIFE 410 (Dover Pub. Inc. 1970) (1931) (the government denaturalized 
her husband using quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over his citizenship status. The 
government alleged that her husband had committed fraud. He never appeared at 
the hearings. Emma Goldman asserted that he did not appear because he was 
deceased at the commencement of the hearings). Until 1922, a foreign national 
woman became a United States citizen by operation of law if she married a United 
States male citizen. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, § 1994, rev.§ 2172, 604, repealed by 
Cable Act, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922). See generally, Marian L. Smith, "Any 
woman who is now or may hereafter be married ... " Women and Naturalization No. 
2, at 146, PROLOGUE (1998), available at http://www.archives.gov/publications 
/prologue/1998/summer/women-and-naturalization -I.html; see also NANCY COTT, 
PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND TIIE NATION (2000) (historical 
analysis of women and citizenship). 
50 See HOYT, supra note 44 ("Reds" is the derogatory nickname given to 
followers of the Bolshevik revolution. The term is often used in the United States 
to refer to any person who is an anarchist or supports communism. The oral 
version of this presentation was made on November 5th, 2009, just one day short 
of the ninetieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution). 
51 HOYT, supra note 44, at 57. 
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The press reported the November and January Raids 
prominently. Historian Edwin P. Hoyt reports that throughout the 
country from May of 1919 to May of 1920 most newspapers were 
enthusiastic supporters of the raids. 52 A newspaper that many view as 
a protector of liberty today, The New York Times, championed the 
raids and called for greater use of deportation to remove the 
disruptive elements in the labor organizations that had so 
prominently been agitating for wage increases and better working 
conditions in the economic turmoil following World War I. 53 
Attorney General Palmer defended the violence of the raids: 
I apologize for nothing that the Department of Justice has 
done in this matter. I glory in it. I point with pride and 
enthusiasm to the results of that work; and if, as I said 
before some of my agents out in the field ... were a little 
rough and unkind or short and curt, with these alien 
agitators whom they observed seeking to destroy their 
homes, their religion and their country, I think it might 
well be overlooked in the general good to the country 
which has come from it. ... 54 
VI. Boston, January 1920: Revolution and Workers 
In January of 1920, when, the chief of the Boston Bureau of 
the Department of Justice, Kelleher, received his instructions from 
the new Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, he 
learned that he must be ready to execute hundreds of administrative 
warrants for the arrest of dangerous aliens all in the same night. 55 He 
52 HOYT, supra note 44, at 128-29 ("[A]lmost all American newspapers were 
following a crusade led by government"). 
53 The Impunity of Bolshevism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1919, in HOYT, supra 
note 44, at 58 ("Rightly or wrongly, the public is becoming cynical, suspicious of 
all these sporadic incursion of the federal authorities into Bolshevikia. Is the public 
to be contented with the inference that is it the government's purpose to deport as 
many of those taken as can be proved to be criminal anarchists?"). 
54 HOYT, supra note 44, at 55. 
55 See Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 32 (D. Ma. 1920) (Kelleher, Chief of 
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was assured that the arrest warrants were all supported by evidence 
from undercover agents and other investigations and that he must 
coordinate support for the arrest with local authorities. His men 
should be ready at seven o'clock in the evening and prepare to be on 
duty for the next twelve hours: until seven o'clock in the morning. 
He must keep the arrests confidential and do his utmost to prevent 
any leaks of the intended round up. 
He did his job well. Somewhere between 400 and 1,200 
people were arrested that night. Agents from the Department of 
Justice, supervised by a handful of people from the immigration 
agency, then housed within the Department of Labor, combined with 
local police, roused hundreds of Lithuanians, Poles, Russians and 
other primarily Eastern Europeans out of club meetings, evening 
language classes, boarding houses and private homes. 
The raid in Boston was not the only immigration raid in the 
country. On the same night, Department of Justice officials were 
arresting people: 700 in New York, 200 in Philadelphia; 400 in 
Detroit, and at least 400 in Boston.56 Collectively more than 2,600 
all together, although one newspaper account reported 4,000 "Reds" 
were arrested in 35 cities.57 
While Palmer assured Congress that his raids had netted 
3,000 perfect cases, many of those arrested were ultimately let go. 
By April of 1920, Louis Post, the Assistant Secretary of Labor who 
at this time had authority over the removal orders58, had reviewed the 
the Boston Bureau of the Dep 't of Justice, is named as head of the Boston bureau 
in the litigation surrounding the raids). 
56 HOYT, supra note 44, at 55, 88. 
57 HOYT, supra note 44, at 87-88. 
58 The authority for managing the immigration laws of the United States was 
not transferred from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice until 
1940. In 2002, Congress created the current agency, the Department of Homeland 
Security and transferred most immigration related agencies to that new department. 
The immigration courts remain within the Department of Justice and are currently 
called the Executive Office for Immigration Review. For a history of the agencies 
controlling immigration, see United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Historical Immigration and Naturalization Legislation, http://www.uscis.gov/ 
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb 1 d4c2a3 e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1 a/?vgnextoid=dc60 
e ldf53b2f0 I OV gn VCM 1OOOOOOecdl90aRCRD&vgnextchannel=dc60e 1 df53b2f0 I 
OVgnVCMIOOOOOOecdl90aRCRD (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
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administrative hearings in 1,600 cases and cancelled the arrest 
warrants for lack of evidence or violations of procedure in 1, 141 of 
those. 59 He further ordered the release of hundreds who had been 
arrested without warrants. 
Post's authority over these cases was challenged by Palmer 
and J. Edgar Hoover. They believed that Caminetti, as 
Commissioner of Immigration, should have the final authority over 
the validity of the orders of deportation. They accused Post of 
obstructing the work of the immigration commissioner. A Kansas 
congress member drafted a resolution calling for the impeachment of 
Louis Post and by April 27, 1920, Post was called before the House 
Rules Committee of the House to defend his deportation 
cancellations. 60 
For three days, the 73 year old Louis Post explained to the 
Rules Committee that he acted as he felt he must in order to defend 
the law. He explained that the law required more than guilt by 
association to establish deportability; that the raids had deliberately 
interfered with the right to counsel; that the right to seek a reasonable 
bond had been withheld; that in many cases no interpreter was 
present and the record clearly indicated that the individual had no 
knowledge of why he was arrested or of the tenets of any radical 
organization. 
Perhaps most importantly, Post reminded Congress that the 
Supreme Court had insulated the decisions of the Department of 
Labor from judicial review and found that the normal protections of 
criminal prosecutions were not appropriate in administrative 
immigration proceedings. Thus, Post said, as the final arbiter of the 
rights of these individuals he felt it even more important for the 
agency itself to guarantee that the decisions were supported by 
competent evidence and not testimony obtained in violation of the 
law. 
59 Lours POST, THE DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM OF NINETEEN-TWENTY: A 
PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A HISTORIC OFFICIAL EXPERIENCE (Da Capo Press 
1923) (1970) (Louis Post recounts these times in his excellent memoir). 
60 Id. 
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During this same time period, Palmer warned the press that 
the Department of Justice had uncovered a national plot for a May 
Day uprising or violent revolution. Police and federal forces 
mobilized across the country. No revolution occurred and, in fact, it 
was a quiet May Day. 
Perhaps because of the quiet, perhaps because of the growing 
voices of opposition to the use of such large scale raids and 
detention, the political tide appeared to change. In early May, the 
House Rules Committee reconvened and told Post that he need not 
attend; instead, they .called Attorney General Palmer before them to 
explain the actions of the Department of Justice. While the 
Committee ultimately issued a citation warning Post of obstructing 
the removal of dangerous aliens, far more damaging was the 
condemnation of the Attorney General that began to grow in that late 
spring of 1920. The tide seemed to shift as the abuses of the raids 
became apparent. 
After Palmer's appearance before the Rule Committee the 
New York Post reported: 
The simple truth is that Louis F. Post deserves the gratitude 
of every American for his courageous and determined 
stand in behalf of our fundamental rights. It is too bad that 
in making this stand he found himself at cross-purpose 
with the Attorney General, but Mr. Palmer's complaint lies 
against the Constitution and not against Mr. Post.61 
In late May of 1920, a number of very prominent law 
professors (including the future Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter) and prominent attorneys wrote a report condemning the 
excesses of the Department of Justice. 62 They reported the following 
violations: 
Use of agent provocateurs, who infiltrated the radicals' 
organizations and incited others to violence; 
61 LOUIS POST, supra note 59, at 271. 
62 R.G. BROWN ET AL., NATIONAL POPULAR GOVERNMENT LEAGUE, TO THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE. REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF THE UNITED 
STA TES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 1920). 
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Wholesale arrests and imprisonment of men and women 
without warrants for arrest in violation of the Constitution 
of the United States; 
Illegal search and seizure of persons and property; 
Forgery by agents of the Department of Justice to supply 
false evidence; 
Criminal thefts of money and valuable belonging to those 
arrested; 
Cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners including 
beatings, threats and unsanitary detention; 
Brutal and indecent treatment of women prisoners in 
searches and in detention; 
Filthy conditions of confinement and some prisoners were 
kept for weeks without having charges made against them; 
and 
Use of government funds to spread newspaper propaganda, 
sending out reports and cartoons to make a popular case 
for the Department of Justice.63 
35 
VII. Judicial Condemnation of the Palmer Raids: At Least for a Brief 
Moment 
While political and public opinion was growing uneasy about 
the massive raids and the tactics of the government, what perhaps 
crystallized public opinion even more was the massive detention of 
men, women and children on Deer Island outside of Boston. When 
the Department of Justice had organized the massive raids in the 
winter of 1920, they had not made many arrangements for the 
detention of the people they would arrest. In haste, they decided to 
use a medical research station, abandoned after World War II, to 
temporary house the "Reds" pending their deportations. This 
abandoned medical center was not in good condition and in the case 
challenging the legality of the arrests and the conditions of detention, 
63 BROWN, supra note 62. 
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the detainees testified that it fell largely to the detainees themselves 
to organize the detention center and to try to make it habitable. 
Judge Anderson of the federal district court in Boston held a 
fifteen day trial and took fifteen hundred pages of testimony about 
the operations of the February raids.64 In his eighty page opinion, he 
details some of the detention conditions: 
At Deer Island the conditions were unfit and chaotic. No 
adequate preparations had been made to receive and care 
for so large a number of people. Some of the steam pipes 
were burst or disconnected. The place was cold; the 
weather was severe. The cells were not properly equipped 
with sanitary appliances. There was no adequate number 
of guards or officials to take a census of and properly care 
for so many. For several days the arrested aliens were held 
practically incommunicado. There was dire confusion of 
authority as between the immigration forces and the 
Department of Justice forces, and the city officials who 
had charge of the prison. Most of this confusion and the 
resultant hardship to the arrested aliens were probably 
unintentional; it is now material only as it bears upon the 
question of due process of law, shortly to be discussed. 
Undoubtedly it did have some additional terrorizing effect 
upon the aliens. Inevitably the atmosphere of lawless 
disregard of the rights and feelings of these aliens as 
human beings affected, consciously or unconsciously, the 
inspectors who shortly began at Deer Island the hearings, 
the basis of the records involving the determination of their 
right to remain in this country. 
In the early days at Deer Island one alien committed 
suicide by throwing himself from the fifth floor and 
dashing his brains out in the corridor below in the presence 
of other horrified aliens. One was committed as insane; 
others were driven nearly, if not quite, to the verge of 
insanity. 
After many days of confusion, the aliens themselves, under 
64 See Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Ma. 1920). 
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the leadership of one or two of the most intelligent and 
most conversant with English, constituted a committee, 
and represented to Assistant Commissioner Sullivan, that, 
if given an opportunity, they would themselves clean up 
the quarters and arrange for the orderly service of food and 
the distribution of mail. This offer was wisely accepted, 
and thereupon the prisoners created a government of their 
own, called, ironically, I suppose, "The Soviet Republic of 
Deer Island." Through the assistance of this so-called 
Soviet government, conditions orderly, tolerable, not 
inhumane, were created after perhaps 10 days or 2 weeks 
of filth, confusion, and unnecessary suffering. It is not 
without significance that these aliens, thus arrested under 
charges of conspiracy to overthrow our government by 
force and violence, were, while under arrest, many of them 
illegally, found to be capable of organizing amongst 
themselves, with the consent of and in amicable co-
operation with their keepers, an effective and democratic 
form of local government. 65 
37 
Despite the concerns over the ill-prepared detention centers 
and the findings by Judge Anderson that some of the arrests were 
made in violation of the Department of Labor rules and that 
techniques used in invading people's homes and offices without 
specific warrants violated their Fourth Amendment rights, the 
constitutional and administrative law standards of the day largely 
immunized the actions of the executive branch from scrutiny. 
Although Judge Colyer did find that some of the aliens detained 
could be eligible for bail, he also concluded that, as a general 
proposition, the Department of Labor should have time to complete 
its administrative hearings. Ultimately, on appeal to the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, that court concluded that the District Court should 
not have ordered the release on bail of any of the aliens as the 
government had substantial evidence that membership in the 
Communist party and its general tenets made these men and women 
inherently dangerous aliens who could be subjected to removal.66 
65 Colyer, 265 F. 17. at 45. 
66 See Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st Cir. 1922). 
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Historian Lucy Salyer reports that while these "Red" Scare 
Raids did lead to some criticism of the methods of the federal 
government, studies conducted a decade later found that most of the 
tactics and practices remained largely unchanged and that judicial 
oversight remained quite minimal.67 In particular, she writes that 
bail "remained out of reach of the vast majority of aliens," and 
therefore aliens remained in detention at "immigration stations or 
more commonly, at local jails for weeks or even months."68 
We do tend to think of the Palmer Raids as a shameful 
moment in our nation's history, but reading the history of the period 
and comparing it to the detention practices of today, it is possible 
that the reader will conclude that we have, if anything, made 
detention and large scale raids an essential feature of our 
immigration laws. The key distinction perhaps should be that those 
raids were believed necessary and justifiable because of specific 
concerns for a national security and yet, even that argument seems 
weak in light of the historical record. Of all these dangerous 
radicals, few were actually deported and most were ordinary 
immigrant working men and women committed to a new political 
ideal and not actively engaged in acts of violence or revolution. 
Still the fundamental link in the public mind of immigration 
and fear of an internal attack on national security, a revolution is 
solidified with these raids and is not questioned seriously by judicial 
action or legislative reform. The exceptionalism that surrounds 
much of immigration law doctrine that began with the Chinese 
Exclusion law and solidified in the Palmer Raids, unfortunately, has 
yet to be dismantled. If anything, in the second half of the 20th 
Century plenary control over immigrants was reinforc~d while civil 
liberties and improvements in administrative law procedure were 
generally being strengthened and expanded. 
67 SALYER, supra note 35, at 242-44. 
68 Id. at 243 (citing William C. Van Vleck, an individual who conducted an 
independent investigation of the now called Bureau of Immigration). 
2010] DETENTION AND IMMIGRATION 39 
VIII. Detention in the Cold War 
Similar to the prior periods of fear, the government again 
reacted to fear of revolution, attack or ideology in the period during 
World War II, and the beginning of the Cold War.69 Of course, we 
all know of the wholesale internment and detention of the Japanese, 
both citizens and legal resident aliens, during World War II; and the 
Supreme Court's refusal to interfere with the executive power to 
detain during the War Period. 70 Yet, for far too many of us, we 
assumed that civil detentions were limited to the Japanese or to the 
war period. In fact, immigration detention had continued unabated 
and was dramatically expanded following World War II as the Cold 
War with Communist forces began. 
While the Supreme Court had unequivocally ruled that aliens 
could not be detained without judicial trial as a means of punishment, 
the case had allowed that some civil detention might be permissible 
when necessary as a form of preventative detention adjunct to. the 
deportation process. In 1951, the Supreme Court majority forcefully 
authorized the use of detention of non-citizens facing removal based 
on active membership in the Communist Party. 71 The arrested non-
citizens had argued that the government could not detain them 
pending removal absent specific evidence that they were likely to 
flee. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, now a division of 
the Department of Justice, had made no such finding, but ruled that 
the agency had the authority to detain on a general theory of national 
security. The Supreme Court affirmed that agency's determination, 
finding that the philosophy of violence against the Government was 
sufficient to authorize the detention. This decision ushered in a new 
period of isolation and immunity for the agency's detention 
determinations. 72 
69 Detentions were also used during World War I. See HIGHAM, supra note 23 
(account of the detention of Germans as "enemy aliens" during World War I as 
well as an excellent history of the use of national security rationales against 
immigration populations). 
7° Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944). 
71 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541 (1952). 
72 See Cole, supra note 7, at 1016-17 (discussing Landon, 342 U.S. at 542). 
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Whether arriving at the border73 or facing removal after a 
long residence, the non-citizen could face lengthy immigration 
detention. And once entrenched, the authority to detain grew to be a 
tool used by the government in cases beyond those involving risk of 
flight or fears for national security. 
A. Removal of Migrant Workers 
The beginning of what many people today associate with 
"border control" and the use of immigration detention as a way to 
demonstrate control over the border began with the removal of 
migrant workers. Notably different from detention efforts in the 
past, this movement no longer relied exclusively on the justification 
of security. Even as detention was being used a means of controlling 
non-citizens removable as members of the Communist Party, the 
immigration service also used large scale raids and detention as part 
of the sweeps relating to the removal of Mexican people. 74 Dean 
Kevin Johnson writes that in a program more than ten times the size 
of the Japanese internment, people of Mexican ancestry were 
"repatriated" through forced removal. Nearly 60% of those removed 
were U.S. citizens.75 During the massive sweeps during the 
depression, state and local government and even private 
organizations were the primary agents of deportation. 76 In the 
73 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1952) 
(holding that a detention of a new immigrant is authorized and summary secret 
exclusion proceeding sufficient as a matter of due process); Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-16 (1953) (holding that twenty-five year 
resident returning after lengthy absence could also be subject to detention and 
summary secret exclusion process, detention authorized despite no immediate 
prospects of deportation). See also Charles Weisselberg, The Exclusion and 
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and lgnatz Mesei, 143 
U. PA. L. REV. 935, 954 (1995) (stating that both Knauff and Mesei were both 
released as a matter of agency discretion). 
74 Kevin Johnson, Fifteenth Annual Dyson Distinguished Lecture: The 
Forgotten "Repatriation" of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the 
"War on Terror," 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005), reprinted in 11-13 BENDER'S 
IMMIGR. BULL. 1 (2006) (discussing the forced repatriations of people of Mexican 
descent and linking the patterns of control to the expansion of racial profiling and 
detention today). 
75 Johnson, supra note 74, at 4. 
76 MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING 
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1940's and early 1950's Congress created a guest workers program 
for Meixcan labor. These workers were called Braceros. 77 
Originally, authorized to work and reside in the U.S. during the labor 
shortages created by World War II, in 1954, the U.S. government, in 
cooperation with the Mexican government, began a campaign of 
rounding up and removing these guest workers. 78 In the original 
documentation authorizing the use of detention and justifying the 
raids, the government asserted the need to control the Southern 
Border and alleged that as many as a 100 radicals a day were 
crossing from the South. 79 While this statement appears to have been 
largely propaganda, no one seriously challenged the legitimacy of the 
Border Patrol round ups, detentions and removals. 
Thus, detention and mass raids moved from the fear of the 
radical to the general removal of workers who had overstayed 
authorized visas or who had not been able to secure permanent 
residence. 80 As the years passed detention became an ordinary tool 
OF MODERN AMERICA 71 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004). 
77 See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 
IMMIGRATION, AND THE INS (1992) (exploring the history of the Bracero program); 
see also JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION 
OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980) (also exploring the history 
of the Bracero program). 
78 See Kelly Lytle Hernandez, The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal 
Immigration: A Cross-Border Examination of Operation Wetback: 1943 to 1954, 
3 7 WESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERL y 421 (2006) (Professor Hernandez reports on 
the participation of the Mexican government that wanted to gain more control of 
the workers and force them to work in agriculture within Mexico as a condition of 
return after deportation from the United States). 
79 See, e.g., Manuel Garcia y Griego, The Importation of Mexican Contract 
Laborers to the United States: 1942-64: Antecedents, Operation and Legacy, 
Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican Studies, U.C. SAN DIEGO 1 (1981); see also 
James F. Smith, United States Immigration Policy - A History of Prejudice and 
Economic Scapegoatism?: A Nation that Welcomes Immigrants?: A Historical 
Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & 
PoL'Y 227 (1995). See also NGAI, supra note 76, at 274 (discussing fear of 
communist entry from the Southern border being part of the justification for 
control of Mexican workers). 
80 See Schriro, supra note 1, at 6 (the history of the treatment of Mexican 
people in the U.S. is very complex and this discussion necessarily truncates that 
complexity. Perhaps the most valid historical discussion of detention in the United 
States would be based on tracing the use of detention as a tool to control Mexican 
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used to enforce deportation. For the most part, detention was not 
necessarily a long period; however, there were sad and devastating 
exceptions. 
B. Cuban and Haitian Detention 
As was already introduced in the discussion of Clark v. 
Martinez, 81 an estimated 125,000 Cuban citizens arrived in the U.S. 
as part of a short lived release by the Cuban government in 1979. 82 
While Cuban citizens have a special path to permanent residence 
through the Cuban Adjustment Act83 to be eligible for adjustment, 
the individual had to be admitted to the U.S. and not be barred by 
criminal convictions or later criminal conduct in the U.S. The Cuban 
government had released a number of people from criminal custody 
as part of the general release and U.S. authorities began to detain 
these people while determining their eligibility for adjustment of 
status to permanent residence. Others committed crimes within the 
U.S. and became unable to acquire permanent resident status or 
became subject to deportation. The immigration related detained 
population of Cubans grew and for some individuals detention was 
almost unbroken for more than twenty years. 
Mark Dow, an independent journalist, prepared a compelling 
account of the harsh realities of immigration detention in his 2004 
book, American Gulag: Inside US. Immigration Prisons. His 
interviews with detainees and the government officials responsible 
for managing the detention centers reveal many of the worst 
problems in modem immigration detention; the fear of release and 
the lack of accountability for the circumstances of detention. The 
book relates dozens of stories from inside immigration detention 
centers and ends with several stories about Cuban detention. He 
migration. Today, 65% of the people held in immigration detention are from 
Mexico). 
81 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
82 Id. at 374 (citing Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982)); Benitez 
v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (providing facts of the boatlift 
from Cuba). 
83 Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994)). 
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quotes an attorney who had experience representing the long term 
detainees from Cuba. "If I had to tell what it was like to visit the 
detainees in one sentence it would be this: It is like visiting people 
who are buried alive."84 
Mark Dow reports on the story of Omar Rodriguez, who due 
to a criminal conviction for attempted burglary after his arrival from 
Cuba, was subject to immigration detention. Though the criminal 
sentence was probation, Rodriguez violated probation by possessing 
two ounces of marijuana. He spent two years in jail in Texas for the 
criminal conviction and at the time of Dow's book, Rodriguez had 
been in immigration detention for twenty years. 85 While the vast 
majority of the Cubans who arrived in the mass exodus from Cuban 
were not subjected to lengthy detention, the government had 
confirmed that over 1,750 Mariel Cubans were detained and Dow 
confirmed in November, 2003 that 1,100 Cubans were in 
immigration detention. 86 More than one thousand people remain 
detained more than 25 years after the original arrival in the U.S. 
The Cuban experience is exceptional for many reasons but 
the pattern of the government responding to the arrival of a large 
number of people with the tool of detention as part of the 
immigration process became well established. Certainly, detention 
was a common tool used to control the arrival of Haitians, especially 
after the political coup in 1990. 
In their article exploring the power of the Executive branch to 
control immigration policy Professors Cox and Rodriguez describe 
the history of the arrival of Haitian people as follows: 
Though Haitian asylum seekers began arriving by boat in 
1963, it was not until the 1970s that the poorest Haitians 
began large-scale unauthorized travel by sea in 
dangerously flimsy and overcrowded vessels, fleeing the 
merciless regime of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, 
who became President of Haiti in 1971 after his father's 
84 MARK Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE IMMIGRATION PRISONS 289 (Univ. 
of Calif. Press 2004). 
85 Id. at 294. 
86 Id. at 370 n.10. 
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death. Between 1972 and 1979, 7837 Haitians arrived in 
the United States by makeshift vessels. In 1980 alone, 
24,530 so-called Haitian "boat people" arrived in the 
United States, coinciding with the Mariel exodus from 
nearby Cuba. An additional 28,000 Haitians were 
interdicted during the next decade. The 1991 military coup 
that ousted democratically elected President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide set in motion yet another major chain of boat 
migration. During the single month of May 1992, for 
example, the United States Coast Guard intercepted 10,000 
Haitians as they attempted to flee lawlessness and violence 
in Haiti. This pattern of migration has continued into this 
century. Between fiscal years 1998 and 2003, the Coast 
Guard interdicted more than 1000 Haitians each year; in 
2004, interceptions reached a peak of 3229. [footnotes 
omitted.]87 
Once the federal government expanded its use of detention 
and established facilities for immigration related detention, the 
pattern was set and detention expanded beyond the initial response to 
a sudden large influx. Detention was justified as a way of deterring 
Haitians from attempting to enter the U.S. without documents and as 
the exodus out of Haiti expanded, the U.S. began to interdict Haitians 
attempting to arrive at sea. In the early 1990's the U.S. government 
used military detention camps on Guantanamo to detain some of the 
Haitians who, although having been screened as having bona fide 
refugee claims, were otherwise inadmissible to the U.S. primarily 
because they were carrying the H.I.V. virus. 88 
87 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 YALE L. J. 398, 492-93 (2009). (citing Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. 
Research Serv., CRS Report for Cong., U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian 
Migrants 2 (2005), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/l 0207 I 
3662). 
88 See generally BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: How A BAND 
OF LAW STUDENTS FOUGHT THE PRESIDENT AND WON (2005) (telling the story of 
litigation surrounding the Guantanamo detention of Haitian refugees); see also 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding the legality 
of interdiction at sea and finding that the Refugee Act did not prevent the United 
States government from returning people). 
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C. Delays in Adjudication and Lengthy Detention 
Similar to the expansion due to sudden influxes from the 
Caribbean, the disruptive civil wars of the mid-1980's in Central 
America lead to an increase in immigrants from that region. The 
1980 passage of the Refugee Act formally added a provision 
allowing people who entered the U.S., even without documents, to 
seek asylum and to receive work authorization pending the 
adjudication of the application. At its high water mark, the 
immigration agency and courts received more than 150,000 
applications for asylum in one year. 89 The immigration court had 
been handling a case load of approximately 50,000 cases a year. 90 
Within a brief period of time, the deportation process expanded to 
four to six years and the ability to locate people when a final order of 
deportation was issued became more complex.91 The government 
reported that an extraordinarily high percentage of people did not 
respond to final orders and further, that many people apprehended in 
89 David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: Navigating the Coast of 
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1310 (1990) [hereinafter Martin, Reforming 
Asylum Adjudication] (discussing the asylum adjudication system before the 
reforms of 1994 and noting that, in fiscal year 1989, the district offices of INS 
received over 100,000 applications-a record-and many thousands more were 
filed before immigration judges). Table I shows the rising number asylum 
applications filed in INS offices between the years 1984-1999, but these numbers 
do not take into account applicants who apply "defensively" before immigration 
judges). Id at 1304. Applications made before immigration judges up until 1989 
are found in Table Ill, and the number of asylum applications peaks in 1989 at 
approximately 20,000. Id. at 1310. By 1993, the backlog in the Asylum Office was 
around 300,000 cases. See David. A Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 
Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725, 733 (1995) [hereinafter Martin, Making Asylum 
Policy]. See also David A. Martin, The 1995 Asylum Reforms: A Historic and 
Global Perspective, Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder (May 2000), 
available at: http://www.cis.org/1995AsylumReforms (revealing the high water 
mark came in 1994 and 1995 when the INS received between 140,000 to 150,000 
new asylum claims in one year not including those that were heard only in 
immigration courts). 
90 Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication, supra note 89, at 1310 
(demonstrating in Table III, the number of cases before immigration judges 
between 1985-1989). 
91 Martin, Making Asylum Policy, supra note 89, at 732-38 (discussing the 
backlog of immigration cases which led to many individuals being released with 
work authorization and these people then failed to appear for scheduled hearings). 
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the interior of the U.S. failed to appear for their removal hearings.92 
Congress responded with a number of initiatives including reforming 
the asylum adjudication process, providing for in absentia removal 
orders, authorizing expedited removal, and increasing the resources 
for detention.93 Most importantly, in Section 236 of the INA, 
Congress laid the groundwork for a system of mandatory detention 
for certain types of cases including people who voluntarily apply for 
asylum at the border or airports. 
Again, Mark Dow shares a story of an asylum applicant who 
was apprehended at the border and held in immigration detention 
during the adjudication of her refugee claim. He listened to her story 
which graphically describes transfer to a prison where immigration 
authorities rent space: 
The young woman recalls how certain of the women 
prisoners were summoned by their eight-digit alien 
numbers. They were being transferred to a "real prison." 
They started to cry. They were scared. They tried to call 
relatives and attorneys, but the phones had been turned off. 
The women were shackled and put in a van for the drive. 
At the prison they had to bend and cough and be searched 
again .... 
"They asked me to take off my uniform. They asked me to 
92 Martin, Making Asylum Policy, supra note 89, at 740 (discussing the 
process leading to the early reforms). 
93 See INA § 240(b)(5) (absentia orders); see also INA § 235(b) (the 
extraordinary expedited removal procedure allows an inspector to refuse admission 
to people who are using false documents, lacking documents or who make a 
material misrepresentation or commit fraud. The decision of the inspector is only 
subject to the review of a supervisor and the non-citizen is removed and barred for 
five years. Expedited removal was expanded into the interior twice by OHS 
regulatory notice and now applies to people apprehended within 100 miles of an 
international border if the apprehension is made within two weeks of entry and to 
people who arrive by sea if the apprehension is made within two years. The 
constitutional validity of the interior expansion has not been tested and Congress 
has made it very difficult to seek judicial review of an order issued under the 
expedited removal procedures). See also Designating Aliens for Expedited 
Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004); Notice Designating Aliens Subject 
to Expedited Removal Under INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(iii), 67 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 
13, 2002). 
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take of my underwear and bra ... No, even if you are 
female, I cannot do that."' So the correctional officers 
undressed her. She crawled "down [under] the bed just to 
hide [her] body." Other officers, wearing masks, came 
over and watched. 
Later she spoke to a minister who visited the prison. "Let 
me go and die in my own country," she says she told her. 
"I can't die in America." 
"After going through all of that," the young woman says to 
us, "even after winning asylum, I lost all the joy that was 
in me." 
Then she says that she misses prison. . . . "I felt like that 
was my home for the rest of my life," she says, "I have 
dreams of my friends in detention." They used to stay up 
through the night with her when she couldn't sleep. 
She was released from detention after a year and a half. 
She was granted political asylum. She says, "I felt I was 
leaving my family." 94 
47 
The story of this woman, held in detention for more than a 
year, is not isolated. The latest government report admits that many 
asylum seekers are held for a period in excess of four months 
notwithstanding procedures that try to expedite detained cases. 
D. The Increase in Detention Following September 11, 2001 
While we might think that the historical lessons about 
detention are all in our distant past, the truth is that the greatest 
increase in the use of detention occurred within the last decade. 
After the attacks of September 11, 1991, the Department of Justice 
began several programs that were aimed at arresting people with 
outstanding orders of removal, primarily those of South Asian origin 
and at the same time, many arrests of people and lengthy detention 
for people with ordinary status violation such as the overstay of a 
tourist visa. In her article examining the growing use of criminal 
sanctions and approaches in immigration enforcement, Professor 
94 Dow, supra note 84, at x-xiii. 
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Teresa Miller documents some of the mass arrests of this period: 
Immediately after the terrorist attacks, the Department of 
Justice detained noncitizens who were either suspected of 
having connections to the attacks or ties to terrorism 
pursuant to the FBl's investigation of the attacks. Rather 
than arrest Arab and Muslim men as criminal suspects, law 
enforcement agents utilized the greater latitude and 
reduced accountability under federal immigration law to 
immobilize Arab and Muslim communities. Once 
individuals were detained, federal law enforcement 
officials could interrogate them as part of a criminal 
investigation, while checking their compliance with 
immigration regulations. In the eleven months after the 
attacks, 762 aliens were detained pursuant to the FBI 
terrorism investigation for various immigration offenses, 
including overstaying of visas and illegally entering the 
country. The government claimed that further acts of 
terrorism could be prevented if terrorists and terrorist 
sympathizers were incapacitated, which rationalized the 
massive round-up of Arab and Muslim foreign nationals. 
[footnotes omitted]95 
The total number of people detained after September 11, 
2001 are difficult to assess because the government began to refuse 
to provide the statistical data. Some estimates are that more than 
1,500 people were apprehended.96 Mark Dow devotes a chapter of 
his book about immigration detention to the post 9/11 detentions. 97 
In a government investigation of the arrests, it was noted that there 
were abuses of the procedures normally used for detention.98 
95 Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime 
Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 90 (2005). 
96 David Cole, Operation Enduring Liberty, THE NATION, June 3, 2002. 
97 Dow, supra note 84, at 19-47. 
98 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., The September 11 
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in 
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 148 (Apr. 2003), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. 
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Professor Margaret Taylor has also specifically examined the 
use of detention in this time period. 99 In her very thoughtful article 
she explores how the Department of Justice (then in charge of 
removal proceedings and detention) instituted policies, sometimes 
using a security rationale, to justify detention and the unlawful 
elimination of bond hearings. Most importantly, her article 
documents how the national security rationale spilled over into the 
wholesale detention of Haitians and to preclude bond determinations 
on a generalized assertion of dangerousness. She relates the history 
of a case involving an 18 year old man who was apprehended after 
he illegally entered the U.S. by sea. 100 Arrested shortly after his 
entry, he then sought political asylum. The government justified his 
detention and the detention of all Haitian asylum seekers in this 
manner: 
At the hearing, the INS argued that the release of Joseph or 
any other member of the October 29 migrant group would 
''threaten important national security interests.'' Lest you 
are wondering how the release of a Haitian teenager 
seeking asylum would threaten important security interests, 
the INS, Coast Guard, State Department, and Department 
of Defense all weighed in with the following two-part 
explanation. 
First, the government asserted that because some migrants 
arriving by boat from Haiti might be considered dangerous, 
all of them must be detained. A Coast Guard affidavit 
noted that Haitians previously deported from the United 
States for criminal activity have occasionally been found 
on interdicted boats attempting to return. Additionally, the 
State Department asserted that it had ''noticed an increase 
in third country nations (Pakistanis, Palestinians, etc.) 
using Haiti as a staging point for attempted migration to 
the United States.'' The unspoken premise-made 
obvious in the parenthetical-is that terrorists from the 
Middle East might pose as Haitian boat people, boarding 
99 Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in 
Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 149, 149-50 (2004), reprinted in 9 
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 906, 915 nn.1-4 (2004). 
100 In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (Att'y Gen. 2003). 
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rickety rafts to attempt one of the most dangerous and 
heavily guarded routes to the United States. Even if one 
accepts that premise, however, the INS knew that eighteen-
year-old David Joseph was not a criminal offender or a 
terrorist. Nevertheless, the government argued that, rather 
than making an individualized risk assessment, it is safer to 
lock up everyone who arrives by boat from Haiti to obviate 
this potential threat. 
Second, there was concern that releasing any Haitians 
while their asylum claims were pending would 
encourage others back home to follow. According to 
the Coast Guard and the INS, a surge in migration 
from Haiti caused by the release of any member of the 
October 29 migrant group would "reduc[e] 
responsiveness in other mission areas" and "injure 
national security by diverting valuable Coast Guard 
and DOD resources from counterterrorism and 
homeland security responsibilities.' This of course 
suggests that any expenditure related to immigration 
enforcement--or perhaps any government expense-
impacts national security since it potentially diverts 
resources from the war on terrorism. 
Both the immigration judge and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals rejected these arguments, with 
the appeals board concluding that ''the broad national 
interests invoked by the INS were not appropriate 
considerations .. .in making the bond determination.'' 
With remarkable dispatch, the Attorney General 
vacated the Board decision and issued his own 
opinion mandating detention without bond for Joseph 
and other "similarly situated undocumented seagoing 
migrants.'' The Attorney General explicitly directed 
immigration judges not only to deny bond to all 
Haitian boat people, but also to give credence to any 
executive branch assertion of "significant national 
security interests'' in future bond proceedings. 
[footnotes omitted] 101 
101 Taylor, supra note 99, at 165-67. 
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This single example of the history of how detention rationales 
shift and morph from general control to national security should 
cause us all to pause and really examine the legal and policy 
implications of our use of immigration related detention. 
And so it is difficult to be confident that another large-scale 
internment of Arab Americans and Muslims will not occur similar to 
that experienced by the Japanese during WWII. At a time when our 
nation is facing threats from abroad, and the usual pattern of 
tightening immigration controls and relying on unfounded 
stereotypes resurges, the urge to bring detentions like Korematsu 
back can be felt. The post-9/11 world has also shown us that our 
government still has the power to detain during wartime, and will use 
immigration and classification of "enemy alien" to prevent attacks. 102 
The discrimination that Arab Americans and Muslims have 
experienced has not escaped comparison to the discrimination felt by 
the Japanese during WWII. 103 In a recent article, David Harris 
argues that we can be hopeful that Korematsu will not be extended to 
the war on terror, and that a large-scale internment of Arab and 
Muslim Americans will not occur. 104 
102 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 558-60 (2004). 
103 See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: 
Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women, U. PITT. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER 
No. 2010-03, at 19 (Feb. 2010). 
104 Id. at 31. Professor Harris argues that the holding in Korematsu (that 
internment does not violate the constitution) remains good law today, and a 
"loaded weapon" ready for use. Id. at 19. The desire of some individuals, and 
actions taken since September 11, such as the round-up of Muslim men, interviews 
of Middle Eastern Muslim nationals, categorization of individuals as "enemy 
combatants," and the consideration of the use of internment camps, have suggested 
that we are perhaps close to reaching for the "loaded weapon" of Korematsu. Id. at 
19, 29. Despite the continuing legal validity of Korematsu today, Professor Harris 
argues that an internment similar to that of 1944 is unlikely to occur. Professor 
Harris relies on Learned Hand's speech where he proclaimed, "[l]iberty lies on the 
hearts of men and women" and that we need more than the Constitution to set us 
free to argue that a desire for liberty will prevent a return to Korematsu. Id. at 32. 
Because of the damage Korematsu caused and the lasting impact it had, the move 
to use Korematsu will face resistance. Professor Harris points to the actions of 
groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League, and other civic 
organizations, and individuals to demonstrate that American's memory of the 
horrible effects of the internment camps encouraged groups to voice their concerns 
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The main point for this essay is that once again, in a time of 
fear of foreign nationals, our government used detention and arrest as 
a primary tool to control individuals and that in the aftermath of 
those events, courts, scholars and government inspectors worry about 
the civil rights abuses. Worse still, once again Congress expanded 
and even mandated detention for foreign nationals accused of a link 
to terrorism and appropriated the funds necessary to support the 
expanded enforcement. Further, Congress appears to be using 
detention as it might in criminal prosecution but without the 
attendant Constitutional protections and restrictions that are inherent 
in the criminal adjudication system. 105 Combined with all of the 
early growth in the use of detention, the very existence of the 
mechanism for detention has taken over the rationale. Today the vast 
majority of people held in detention are from Mexico and represent 
people who have entered without documents or overstayed a 
temporary visa. Our rationale of detention to protect us from terror 
or crime has bled into our use of detention as part of the ordinary 
course of immigration enforcement. 
and urge caution in order to prevent the government from making the same 
mistake again. Id. at 33-40. At a time when our nation is facing threats from 
abroad, and the usual pattern of tightening immigration controls and relying on 
unfounded stereotypes resurges, the urge to bring Korematsu back can be felt. 
Professor Harris makes a strong argument that while our Constitution may permit 
Korematsu, the true way our country is avoiding a return to internments, is the 
liberty within each person and the refusal to allow injustice from occurring. Id. at 
40. 
105 This topic of growing "criminalization" of civil immigration enforcement 
is well documented in several articles. See Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 489 (2007) (discussing preventative immigration 
detention); see also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, 
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (reiterating the significant 
overlap between criminal law and immigration law will affect the way decision 
makers view the consequences). 
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IX As Old as the Hills But Why Growing Today? 
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, the Supreme Court 
has placed some due process limits on "unlimited" detention or 
detention where the government has little hope of executing the 
removal order. However, at the same time of these judicial limits, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the power to detain during the removal 
hearing, even for a long term permanent resident. 106 Congress has 
increased the use of immigration detention by mandating detention 
as part of the removal process. 107 Donald Kerwin reports the 
following staggering increase in the budget related to detention and 
removal operations (DRO) and custody operations: 
2005: DRO 1.22 billion, 0.86 billion custody 
2006: DRO 1.65 billion, 1.16 billion custody 
2007: DRO 1.98 billion, 1.38 billion custody 
2008: DRO 2.38 billion, 1.65 billion custody 
2009: DRO 2.48 billion, 1.72 billion custody 
2010: DRO 2.54 billion, 1.77 billion custody108 
The other speakers and authors in this symposium will 
provide more details about the current regime of detention, but it is 
obvious that detention has moved far beyond its early roots as a 
temporary measure used in immigrant inspections or as a tool 
justified by individualized decision-making to secure the nation. 
Is the fact that detention is "as old as the hills" the only 
justification we need to continue its use? Hopefully, this brief 
history has illustrated that the use of civil detention as a part of 
immigration law needs to be seriously examined. The historical 
roots are weak and suspect. While most other areas of law have 
evolved to require the protection of individual liberty and to protect 
people from government control, immigration law remains a sad 
outlier. 
106 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
107 See 8 C.F .R. § 236.1 ( 1999). 
108 See Kerwin & Lin, supra note 2, at 8. 
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X The Detention Evolution 
As we have seen in this essay, the government originally 
argued that detention was a necessary part of border inspection and 
the concept evolved to support detention as a necessary part of the 
hearing process. But, detention was not limited to the context of 
removal alone; instead, it has also grown to be seen as a necessary 
deterrent to unlawful immigration and even to authorize preventative 
detention used when aliens are assumed to pose a risk to security or 
as a part of large scale immigration law enforcement. Moreover, 
neither financial concerns nor human rights concerns have seemed to 
lessen the nation's desire to use detention as a part of the 
immigration enforcement model. 109 What forces might limit the 
growth of detention? 
The best and most long lasting changes would of course, 
come from Congress limiting the use of detention and putting strict, 
clear controls on the agency authority to use detention. Congress 
should restore discretion in the detention decisions and allow both 
immigration judges and the federal courts to test and review 
detention decisions. Yes, this may make the use of detention less 
certain and perhaps administratively more costly, but these restraints 
are the usual ones we employ whenever our government exercises 
civil detention. We also have a range of options to reach some of the 
same goals of detention such as bond, supervised release and in some 
cases, if necessary, electronic monitoring, all of these options are less 
restrictive (and less expensive) alternatives to incarceration of non-
citizens.110 
A. What will you answer when you are asked? 
What did you do? Why did you let it happen? Did you know 
it was happening? If you are interested in taking direct action, visit 
the website of the nonprofit organization Detention Network, an 
organization that works to monitor U.S. immigration detention and to 
seek legislative and administrative reforms. 111 
110 See Kerwin & Lin, supra note 2. 
111 Detention Watch Network, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org (follow 
"Take Action" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
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At the end of his historical account of the Palmer Raids, 
historian James Morton Smith adopts a quote from the author John 
Dos Passos. It is a wise reminder that we can find hope for change in 
our "old as the hills" failures: 
"In times of change and danger when there is a quicksand of 
fear under men's reasoning, a sense of continuity with generations 
gone before can stretch like a lifeline across the scary present."112 
112 SMITH, supra note 18, at 434. 

